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Marketplaces have long provided a context for observing the negotiation of everyday life amid
broader processes of social and economic transformation. A growing scholarship has debated
the relationship between markets and capitalist modes of production in Africa. However, less
attention has been paid to the changing moral dimensions of economic life within popular
urban marketplaces. This article examines the moral economy of a central marketplace in
Kampala, Uganda, through an analysis of a rare archive: the records of the market
disciplinary committee. We show that market vendors have responded to the expansion of
market economy in Kampala by invoking principles derived from the past, including the
obligation to ‘feed’ others. Rather than an abstracted market economy, disputes in the
market were interpreted in the context of an embedded market society in which value is
placed on livelihood facilitation. These findings advance the burgeoning literature on
capitalism in Africa by demonstrating the ways in which neoliberal norms and values are
situated within a broader moral landscape that places limits on what can be exchanged with
whom.
Keywords: capitalism; informal economy; marketplace; moral economy; Uganda
Les marchés fournirent souvent un contexte pour témoigner de comment les réalités
économiques se ‘réalisent’ au cœur de processus plus vastes de transformation sociale et
économique. Des recherches toujours plus nombreuses ont débattu de la relation entre les
marchés et les modes de production capitaliste en Afrique. Cependant, une attention
moindre s’est portée sur les dimensions de changement moral de la vie économique au
cœur des marchés urbains populaires. Cet article examine l’économie morale d’un marché
du centre de Kampala en Ouganda, à travers l’analyse d’une archive rare: les documents du
comité disciplinaire du marché. Nous montrons que les vendeurs sur le marché ont répondu
à l’expansion de l’économie de marché de Kampala en invoquant des principes dérivés du
passé y compris l’obligation de ‘nourrir’ autrui. Plutôt qu’une économie de marché
abstraite, des litiges sur le marché ont été interprétés dans le contexte d’une société de
marché intégré dans laquelle une valeur est attribuée à la facilitation de la subsistance. Ces
découvertes font avancer la littérature capitaliste florissante sur le capitalisme en Afrique
en démontrant les façons dont les normes et les valeurs néolibérales se situent dans un
paysage moral plus vaste qui place des limites sur ce qui peut être échangé et avec qui.
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Introduction: the moral economy of the belly
Temwagala tulye?
Don’t you want us to eat?
In 2007, the Kampala City Council attempted to sell Nakasero market, one of the oldest and
largest produce markets in Uganda, to a private developer. This move was driven in part by a
package of policy reforms that sought to privatize urban service delivery in the city (Gore and
Muwanga 2013; Lindell and Appelblad 2009). In response, thousands of market vendors
organized an overnight protest during which they blockaded roads in Kampala city centre
and held up signs that read ‘is this not our world?’ (‘Mutowoza ensi si jaffe?’) and ‘don’t
you want us to eat?’ (‘temwagala tulye?’). These protests brought into focus the plight of
market traders across the continent in the face of land speculation and spiralling costs of
living. While politicians and business elites defended the sale by reproducing a
formalist understanding of the market as a place in need of ‘modernisation’ and
‘competition’ (New Vision 2007), vendors in Nakasero opposed it by invoking a substantivist
understanding of the market as a place fundamental to the sustenance of human life (Polanyi
1957 [1944]).
In his seminal work on the morality of markets, EP Thompson (1971) observed a similar
clash between the ‘paternalists’ (or state officials) and the ‘crowd’ during food riots in eight-
eenth-century England. While the former emphasized the importance of ‘controlled markets’
and social order, the latter emphasized the importance of ‘open markets’ and sustenance. For
Thompson, the riots demonstrated the moral victory of the crowd, insofar as their claim to nour-
ishment was based upon the mobilization of ‘traditional rights’ and ‘customs’ that drew upon
public support (1971, 78). The advance of capitalist modes of production arguably brought
about a ‘a de-moralizing of the theory of trade and consumption’, associated with an abstract
market mechanism (1971; cited: Götz 2015, 152). However, for Thompson, the moral
economy of the crowd retained ‘an ideal existence’ that was mobilized in times of emergency.
In a not dissimilar way, market vendors in contemporary Uganda contested changes in political
economy by drawing upon moral principles from the past.
Marketplaces have long provided a context for witnessing how economic realities get ‘done’
amid ongoing processes of social and economic transformation (Simone and Pieterse 2017, 89).
This article examines the moral dimensions of economic life in Nakasero market in Kampala,
Uganda, through an analysis of the records of the market disciplinary committee; an institution
which came into being following the successful protests of 2007/8. The market has witnessed
many of the economic disruptions of the postcolonial era in Uganda: from the Asian expulsion
and the magendo (black market) of the 1970s, to the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs)
and privatization initiatives of the 1990s. However, rather than being passive recipients of these
transformations, people have engaged in collective subjective practices to reinterpret and remake
the market by ‘inventively remember[ing]’ norms and values from the past (Lonsdale 1992, 352).
The case of Nakasero market thus demonstrates the value of a moral economy approach for situ-
ating neoliberal reforms within theories of value grounded in local history and culture, revealing
the ways in which ‘people struggle not only for wealth and power, but also for dignity’ (Orlove
1997: cited Palomera and Vetta 2016, 224).
The following section provides a brief overview of the literature on moral economy before
outlining two frameworks for studying moral economic activities in Africa, with a particular
focus on Uganda. We then outline the methodological approach before presenting an analysis
of the case record of the Nakasero market disciplinary committee.
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Moral economies in Africa: two frameworks
The classical literature on moral economy examines the interaction of different norms and values
during transitions from ‘pre-capitalist’ economies to different forms and manifestations of
‘market capitalism’ (Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). Moral economy thus came into currency
as an approach for studying the ‘total socioeconomic context within which the market operate
[s]’ (Thompson 1971, 125) and the ‘systems of meanings, institutions and structures of social
relations’ through which it is interpreted and understood (Palomera and Vetta 2016, 421). This
approach builds upon Polanyi’s (1957 [1944]) substantivist view of economics which rejects
market-oriented theories of scarcity and rational choice in favour of a broader concern with
how humans make a living in interaction with their social and natural environments. On this
reading, all markets are ‘embedded’ in society in one way or another and economic values are
in constant interaction with values derived from other spheres of life. Even advanced capitalist
economies are interdependent with institutions and structures that establish different ideas of
value (Palomera and Vetta 2016). Registers of value are thus not predetermined but ‘open-
ended and internally dynamic’; providing criteria for ‘validating… new dimensions and relating
them to the old’ (Guyer 1993, 253). Indeed, many of the institutions that are today considered
essential features of capitalism – the fictitious commodities of land, labour and money – have
been historically present in societies categorized as ‘non-capitalist’ (Banaji 2015). Moral econ-
omies are thus in a constant state of becoming, shaped by the ‘discontinuities, ruptures and shifts
in the historical process’ that cannot be simply reduced to the binary categories of ‘capitalist’ and
‘non-capitalist’ (Chakrabarty 2000, 23).
Rather than compartmentalizing the world, a moral economy approach is useful precisely for
its ability to bring different regimes of value under the same analytical framework in order to
reveal the complex ways in which they are entangled (Palomera and Vetta 2016, 428). It therefore
has much to offer to studies of socioeconomic life in Africa, which have been historically divided
between sociological approaches focusing on the ‘norms of collective survival’ and materialist
approaches focusing on the ‘ever-expanding market of classical economy’ (Austen 1993, 92).
The following subsections trace the origins of these two literatures before exploring the ways
in which they might be brought together in order to shed light on the moral dimensions of econ-
omic life in a popular Ugandan marketplace.
Relational norms and values in precolonial Buganda
For the majority of human history, people have understood value as something that is generated
through relationships with other people (Elyachar 2005; Scherz 2014; Guyer 1993). For example,
the concept of ‘wealth in people’ came into currency in the literature on exchange in precolonial
Africa to describe the process through which people achieved prominence through the accumu-
lation of dependants (Guyer 1993). In patrimonial societies, the assets or ‘pools of wealth’ were
‘ultimately the extraordinary people – the named heroes, virtuoso performers and craftsmen, the
most deeply concentrated of spiritual adepts – whose self-realization careers skipped around the
value register’ (Guyer 1993, 253). Interdependency was thus a moral imperative, and freedom
derived not from independence but ‘a plurality of opportunities’ for dependence (Ferguson
2015, 163). In the words of Bayart (1993), one could either be a ‘feeder of people’ or an
‘eater of people’, and those unable to feed others found themselves accused of a moral failing
(cited Scherz 2014, 19).
The concept of wealth in people is influential in the anthropological literature on Buganda,1
the region in which Kampala is located. For example, Holly Hanson (2003) writes that the social
and political organization of the region in the precolonial era was based around the intricate
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relationship between love and power. The Baganda used ties of reciprocal obligation ‘to create
connections, to incorporate strangers, and to vanquish competitors’ (2003, 3). Leaders were
obliged to give gifts of food and land to their followers, and accountability was provided by
the ease with which followers could switch allegiance from one leader to another. This system
produced a logic in which ‘those who wielded power had to appear loving in order to hold
onto their followers’ by recognizing their rights to subsistence (2003, 17); a logic which was
invoked in the protests of 2008 (‘don’t you want us to eat?’). The idea of a disembedded
market economy would have made little sense in precolonial Buganda; indeed, people were sus-
picious of attempts by foreign missionaries and traders to establish marketplaces in Kampala at
the end of the nineteenth century (Médard 2006; Monteith 2019). Under pressure from Catholic
missionaries, Kabaka Muteesa I opened the first livestock market on Palace grounds in 1884 and
named it Mwanakuyeeguilira; ‘the people feed themselves’ (by buying from the market). The
people responded with the phrase Kabaka akowadde (‘the Kabaka is becoming selfish’) on
the basis that livestock were previously given as gifts to meet needs and cement alliances
(Médard 2006: FN 92; cited from Kasirye 1954, 429).
China Scherz (2014) brings these arguments into the present through an ethnographic
account of socioeconomic relations in contemporary Buganda. She argues that strategies of
self-making in the region still ‘involve creating and using networks (which are often hierarchical)
to secure support (which is often material)’ (2014, 2). Relationships are regulated by cultural
logics of patronage and moral notions of having ‘a heart for helping’ others (omutima
omuyambi). Consequently, dependence and inequality are not considered social evils in and of
themselves in Buganda; rather, it is a breakdown in the practice of helping others that is a
source of moral anxiety (2014, 96). These observations resonate with other studies of contem-
porary African economies. For example, Julia Elyachar has demonstrated that artisanal econom-
ies in Cairo are underpinned by an understanding of ‘relational value’ – the positive value
attached to the creation, reproduction and extension of relationships’ (2005, 143). Similarly,
Mary Njeri Kinyanjui shows how business practices among market traders in Nairobi are
shaped by values such as ‘solidarity, humanity, endurance, trust and sharing’, which prioritize
collaboration over individual accumulation (2019, 2), while James Ferguson argues that socio-
economic activities in Southern Africa are primarily about ‘securing distributive outcomes’
through relationships with other people (2015, 94). These studies diversify our understandings
of economy beyond formal understandings of market exchange by demonstrating the influence
of norms and values derived from a broad range of institutions and practices, including those
originating in the precolonial era. However, they have less to say about the ways in which
such norms and values have evolved in relation to the market reforms of the past four decades.
Individualistic norms and values in ‘neoliberal’ Uganda
A growing literature warns of the transformation of social and moral visions of economic life in
Africa amid the advance of neoliberal capitalism (Beresford and Cross 2015; Meagher 2007;
Meagher, Mann, and Bolt 2016; Ouma 2015; Wiegratz 2016; Wiegratz, Martiniello, and
Greco 2018). This work revives neo-Marxist and dependencia traditions in the study of
African political economy in order to chart the ‘multifaceted neoliberal reordering of African
countries’ and their impact on people’s lives and livelihoods (Wiegratz, Martiniello, and
Greco 2018, 6). In contrast to the scholarship outlined above, the focus is thus on the ways in
which market reforms have undermined and overwritten relational understandings of value, gen-
erating new forms of debt, exploitation, and inequality.
Uganda features prominently within this literature as a key site of capitalist transformation
(Mamdani 1990; Prunier 1983; Tangri and Mwenda 2001; Wiegratz 2016). The history of
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capitalism in Buganda can be traced back to the arrival of the slave trade on the East African
coast in the mid nineteenth century. Traders bartered cloth for ivory and slaves, turning the
region into a production zone that disrupted the ties of reciprocal obligation on which socioeco-
nomic life had historically rested (Hanson 2003). Wage labour soon followed in the early twen-
tieth century as colonial land reforms and poll taxes forced people to engage in forms of labour
‘outside the realm of Ganda productive activities’ (2003, 154). The British colonial authorities
saw urban marketplaces as key sites of commercial dominance and revenue generation in
their quest to turn Uganda into a profitable colony. Nakasero market was opened in 1927 to
meet a demand generated by the presence of a prosperous, non-land- owning population of
Asian and European settlers; a legacy that is still invoked in contemporary understandings of
the market as a katale ka muzungu (‘market for whites’) (Monteith 2019, 253). Trade licencing
and vagrancy laws were introduced in order to remove ‘unproductive’ African populations from
the market; reforms that served to integrate the ‘political with the social and ethical’ while ‘sub-
ordinating all three to the requirements of production and output’ (Mbembe 2001, 31).
A further wave of market reforms followed under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank in
the 1980s – a key historical period in the literature on capitalist transformation in Uganda.
Inspired by the literature on moral economy, Jörg Wiegratz (2016) argues that we should under-
stand such periods in terms of moral transformation rather than disintegration or decline. On this
reading, the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s facilitated the rise of a particular set of moral norms,
including individualism, self-interest, low other-regard, and disregard for the common good,
which have penetrated the moral order of markets, families, communities and the country at
large (Wiegratz 2016). Such norms are thought to be particularly prevalent in Uganda’s informal
economy, which has expanded at an exponential rate since the 1980s. For example, Nakanyike
Musisi describes the rise of the toninyira mukange (‘don’t step in mine’) model of night market-
ing through which women pursue ‘aggressive mini-capitalist ventures’ by the light of paraffin
lanterns to meet a demand generated by shortages of food and cooking equipment (1995,
128). Women value these markets for the income and friendships they provide but complained
of the prevalence of envy, insecurity and witchcraft – traits that are present in the case record
of the contemporary Nakasero market.
Seen together, these two literatures reflect two contrasting (but not contradictory) premises;
that economies in Uganda are underpinned by relational, pre-capitalist norms and values, and by
individualistic, capitalist norms and values, respectively. The direction of argument hinges on
one’s historical starting point (precolonial, colonial or postcolonial) and methodological orien-
tation (deductive or inductive). However, rather than totalizing frameworks, these two under-
standings – ‘wealth in people’ and ‘wealth in things’ – may be better seen as ideal types,
which have been invoked by different people at different times in order to achieve different
ends. A moral economy approach thus provides a framework to observe the interaction of
these two sets of norms and values within a particular context; to examine the extent to which
‘neoliberal ideas coexist with other, often contradictory ideas’ that ‘may be used to serve alterna-
tive functions’ (Ferguson 2015, 23). The remainder of this article adopts such an approach in
order to examine the ways in which different norms and values are invoked, enacted and con-
tested within a historical marketplace in Kampala, Uganda.
Researching morality in the marketplace
The location and familiarity of marketplaces have long made them attractive sites for dispute res-
olution in African societies, where large crowds provide legitimacy and a notion of the ‘public’ to
proceedings (Bohannan and Dalton 1962; Clark 1994; Kapchan 1996). Empirical work in rural
and urban markets in Africa has shown power to be dispersed across a variety of different
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institutional arrangements, rather than centralized in a single state or authority (Jones 2009; Lund
2006; Pietilä 2007). These institutional arrangements have taken different forms in different
regions of the continent, varying according to the sources and magnitude of demand for particu-
lar commodities and ‘the political and economic circumstances under which these demands were
first manifested’ (Jones 1972, 234; cited Guyer 1987, 9). For example, the precolonial history of
indigenous markets in West Africa was driven by the need to feed large urban settlements
through the consolidation and expansion of regional trade routes (Guyer 1987; Omobowale
2019). Markets were predominated by wealthy elites, religious and ethnic groups and women,
whose participation was enabled by their ability to access a degree of mobility and financial inde-
pendence, as well as the absence of more lucrative economic opportunities (Guyer 1987, 31). By
contrast, markets in precolonial East Africa were largely restricted to the borders and ‘no man’s
lands’ between different kingdoms, with goods generally provided on the basis of gift exchange
and requisition (Médard 2006, 167).
The contemporary organization of market institutions bears the traces of these regional his-
tories. For example, Gracia Clark (2002) shows how processes of dispute resolution in Kumasi
central market in Ghana combine nineteenth century Asante chiefly procedures with Christian
and Islamic religious practice and contemporary legal protocol, resulting in the invocation of
a number of common moral principles including that of ‘something for everyone’; the idea
that everyone has the right to earn a living in the market, irrelevant of their income or economic
contribution (2002, 56). Similarly, in Nigeria, Nkechi Nkwankwo (2019) and Mofeyisara Omo-
bowale (2019) demonstrate the continued influence of elder women, and in particular the figure
of the iyaloja (market mother) in processes of dispute resolution; a figure whose influence has
been weakened in recent years by the emergence of a technocratic class of male traders with
links to the government. In Tanzania, by contrast, Aili Mari Tripp (1997) and Tuulikki Pietilä
(2007) show how female traders have subverted the historical role of the state and (male)
market master in the regulation of market life through strategic forms of gossip and non-compli-
ance. Similarly, Anna Baral (2018) characterizes Kisekka market in Uganda as a ‘moral labora-
tory’ (citing Mattingly 2014) in which traders challenge dominant social and moral principles,
including those of obuntubulamu (politeness, civility) and obuyaaye (rudeness, incivility).
Conflicts over the management of urban marketplaces in Uganda have intensified in recent
years as a result of land speculation and the rise of entrepreneurial modes of municipal govern-
ance (Hansen, Little, and Lynne Milgram 2013; Lindell, Ampaire, and Byerley 2019). Starting in
the 1990s, politicians and investors have sought to privatize and redevelop central markets under
the guise of ‘world-class’ city making, displacing vendors to facilities on the outskirts of the city,
where custom is often scarce and rents prohibitive (Baral 2018; Lindell, Ampaire, and Byerley
2019). Market vendors have responded by staging protests (such as that described in the intro-
duction), registering their own associations as limited companies (mirroring the legal form
taken by businesses involved in the leasing of city markets) and making appeals to influential
patrons. A group of traders incorporated as Nakasero Sitting Traders, and Vendors Limited
(NMSVT) wrote directly to the Ugandan President in 2007 to request assistance. President
Museveni subsequently overturned the sale, declaring: ‘Markets should be for the vendors’,
reflecting the broader phenomenon of politicians reversing policy decisions in order to cultivate
vote banks in competitive urban constituencies (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012; Lindell 2010).
NMSVT eventually signed a 49-year sublease agreement for Nakasero market in 2010,
agreeing to pay an annual ground rent of USh45 million (US$ 18,000). However, vendors’ own-
ership rights were subject to a five-year probationary period during which NMSVTwas required
to pay a one-off premium of USh 1.8billion (USD$ 720,000) in order to redevelop the site into a
‘modern market’ that met ‘universally acceptable standards’. A new era of vendor-led market
management was ushered in, albeit one that indebted the vendors to the municipal authority
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and required them to demonstrate ‘modern’ forms of management in keeping with the city’s
‘world-class’ aspirations.
Nakasero is a market comprised of approximately 10,000 vendors, traders and service pro-
viders. In purely material terms, people’s status in the market is defined by (i) the type of
space that they operate in (improvised ‘pitches’, market stalls or lock-up shops), (ii) their con-
tractual relationship to this space (owner or renter) and (iii) their employment status (employee,
employer or self-employed) (Young 2021). Those generating the largest profits in the market
tended to be owners of lock-up shops (with average daily profits of approximately 15,000
USh / US$ 41) and those generating the smallest were renters of improvised spaces (23,000
USh / US$ 6).2 While the former were often described as ‘high earners’ in the market, the
latter were described as ‘low earners’; categories that are loosely analogous to socioeconomic
class. NMSVT was established by a group of 187 shareholders (99 men and 88 women), of
which the majority were stall leaseholders from the Buganda region in which Kampala is
located. The new leadership of the market was elected from this group, with priority given to
those who were seen to be educated, to ‘speak well’ and to be supporters of the ruling party
in order to ensure the continued sympathies of the Ugandan president. Godfrey Kakooza, a
long-term stall leaseholder with a legal qualification was declared the new chairman of the
market, reflecting the broader influx of a technocratic class of men into the management of
urban markets across the continent (Nkwankwo 2019; Omobowale 2019).
NMSTV began its tenure by creating a series of new committees that centralized historical
features of market life, such as discipline and sanitation, which had previously been left at the
discretion of individual areas and leaders. The new disciplinary committee comprised 13
members – 9 men and 4 women – all of whom were ‘high earning’ stall tenants and owners,
of reasonable age (40 plus) with experience of handling disputes in their particular areas of
the market. The committee members all had names originating from the Buganda region of
Uganda in which Kampala is located, compared to 73% of traders in the market more broadly
(author’s survey, 2014). This article analyses the records of the committee, which sat between
2009 and 2012. These records comprise case proceedings, witness statements, formal decisions,
and letters outlining punishments and apologies, the existence of which represented an attempt
by the leadership to demonstrate its legitimacy as a ‘modern’ market authority through analogy
to the bureaucratic procedures of the state. The first author obtained access to these records
towards the end of a twelve-month period of ethnographic fieldwork in the market (see Monteith
2017). A group of leaders and former committee members agreed to share the records on the con-
dition that we preserve the anonymity of all those involved.
The records contain 67 cases seen by the committee, reduced down to 55 complete cases with
documented start and end points.3 This is not a large number of cases for a market of 10,000
people. Indeed, most problems and disputes in the market continued to be resolved at lower
levels through the ad hoc intervention of leaders within particular commodity chains (e.g. toma-
toes, butchery, poultry) selected for their patronage, charisma, and demonstrated ability to
resolve conflicts in the market. The new committee was a place for the hearing of significant dis-
putes that could not be resolved at lower levels – for example, those involving multiple parties,
powerful actors and/or particularly serious transgressions. The methodological implications of
this are that disputes involving less influential actors in the market (often young people and
new arrivals) are largely omitted from the analysis, although the details of such disputes were
captured through semi-structured interviews and conversations conducted as part of the ethno-
graphy (see Monteith 2018).
When we asked vendors why they generally elected to report important cases to the market
disciplinary committee rather than the police, they emphasized that the police were ‘corrupt’
(obukenuzi) and inefficient. Police investigations demanded considerable time and resources
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from plaintiffs, often requiring them to build the case themselves, including the facilitation of key
witnesses. Furthermore, there was no guarantee of a favourable outcome. Indeed, imprisoning a
debtor – the modus operandi of the Kampala police – was seen as counterproductive insofar as it
prevented the accused from repaying their debt. Consequently, court cases were seen to be more
expensive and riskier for both sides of a dispute. In contrast, the market disciplinary committee
was expedient and had the capacity to enforce a broader range of judgements that were sensitive
to the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant, preserving the flow of trade in the market.
Committee leaders were able to locate and summon witnesses more effectively than the police
but were also accused of self-interest at times (some of the most severe punishments were
reserved for those accused of ‘disrespecting’ market leaders).
Table 1 provides an overview of the types of cases brought to the committee during its lifespan.
The case record is dominated by verbal and physical disputes over space and debt. A typical case is
one in which someone in the market is perceived to have encroached on a neighbour’s space – often
by moving goods across a boundary – or failed to repay a debt accrued when purchasing items on
credit. In response, the other party confiscates or destroys the offending items, leading to the out-
break of an argument (‘quarrelling’) that could then escalate into a physical confrontation (‘fight-
ing’). Cases involving women tended to involve accusations of moral transgression (e.g. of
witchcraft and adultery) which served to facilitate the social isolation of a rival in the market,
while cases involving men often involved more direct threats of physical violence. Women were
almost twice as likely to be accused of a transgression than men, reflecting the gendered makeup
of both the committee and the norms and values which it sought to uphold (explored below).
The following sections examine these cases in further detail, with a particular focus on three
themes that emerged from the case record: property, debt and livelihood. These themes are
loosely analogous to the three ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, money and labour which Polanyi
(1957 [1944]) associated with the expansion of market economy, enabling us to explore the connec-
tions between the case records and broader processes of socioeconomic transformation in Uganda.
Following Thompson (1971), we place emphasis on both the experiences of people involved in each
case and the web of norms, values and obligations in which they are entangled.
Table 1. Market cases and accused persons, 2009–2012a.
Cases Accused persons
Type of charge Frequency Male Female
Quarrelling (verbal) 13 8 19
Non-payment of debt 13 8 6
Use of bad/abusive language 12 5 19
Fighting (physical) 9 9 5
Neglect of leadership duties 9 11 3
Rumour mongering 7 0 17
Disrespecting market leaders 5 2 10
Use of threatening language 5 6 2
Domestic dispute 4 3 3
Obtaining or selling by false pretences 4 3 1
Use of witchcraft 1 0 7
Theft of property 1 1 0
TOTAL 83 56 92
aThe ‘types of charge’ described here are taken directly from the language of the meeting minutes, with the exception
of ‘domestic dispute’ and ‘obtaining or selling by false pretences’. A single case often involved multiple charges and
multiple accused persons; for example, seven women were accused in the single case of witchcraft. Of the 67 cases, 28
were reported by men, 25 by women and 14 by unspecified members of the disciplinary committee.
8 W. Monteith and L. Camfield
Disciplining the market
Property
A number of cases brought before the disciplinary committee concerned the issue of property, or
more specifically, ownership of space in the market. The commoditisation of land in Kampala
can be traced back to the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which divided crown (British) from
mailo (Baganda) land, enforcing private tenure over vast swathes of communal land. Nakasero
market was constructed by the British colonial authorities on ‘crown’ land, which was sub-
sequently transferred into the ownership of the Kampala City Council (KCC) following
Uganda’s independence in 1962. Shops and stalls in Nakasero market were sold on 49-year lea-
sehold agreements in the 1960s as part of a process of economic nationalization designed to
create a new class of Ugandan business owners in urban centres. Rather than sold at market
rates, many were given as gifts to civil servants and their families; for example, one of the
leaders of the contemporary market inherited his stall from his father, who had been given
four stalls while working for the Kampala City Council in the 1960s, reflecting the broader
phenomenon of the hoarding of market stalls by the urban middle classes (Lindell, Ampaire,
and Byerley 2019; Omobowale 2019). Today over two-thirds of people operating from shops
and stalls rent their spaces from a leaseholder (author’s survey, 2014). The long-term leasing
of stalls created a rentier class in the market, which continues to dominate institutions such as
the disciplinary committee. However, ownership arrangements are complex and individual
units frequently (sub)rented, sold and gifted. For example, an elder witness was called before
the committee to clarify the ownership status of a shop behind the market office:
The place behind the office first belonged to Mirundi4 since the time of Bbosa [former market chair-
man]. After this, Mirundi rented it to Joseph [Mukasa’s brother] who then took responsibility. Before
Mirundi, it belonged to Kyegera, whose aunt Nalumu, gave it to Mirundi.
Case 15, 24/03/2010
Such cases invoked a principle of private property. However, rather than an abstract right, this
principle was contextualized in relation to the lineage of different leaders and families in the
market. For example, the above case was settled not by the production of an impersonal docu-
ment such as a deed of ownership but through the testimonies of elder vendors who were able
to historicize the ownership of particular spaces in the market. In this way, property was under-
stood to be embedded in social relationships in Nakasero, and gifts of property used to ‘to create
connections’ and cement alliances; in this case between the families of Kyegera and Mirundi
(Hanson 2003, 3).
A large number of the fights and quarrels in the case record (Table 1) were the result of
boundary disputes between tenants:
Nalongo had a misunderstanding with Betty related to the space where they work from. Each accused
the other of encroaching on their space. Nalongo reports that Betty uses her space and when she tries
to talk to her she just abuses her and uses bad language, accusing her of being a witch (omulogo).
Betty tells the committee that when the landlord gave her the shop, he showed her the boundaries
and she has never exceeded them. She said even the landlord of shop 34 [Nalongo’s shop] agreed
to these boundaries. Betty accepted that she had quarrelled with Nalongo… but she said that
Nalongo told her that she had aborted many children. The committee concluded that both parties
had abused the other and told them not to quarrel again in the market. Members of the committee
visited the disputed space and told Berry to move a box of phones to clear the path to Nalongo’s
shop. They also told Nalongo not to block the path outside Betty’s shop. Both parties agreed.
Case 55, 04/10/2011
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The committee sought to resolve such blockages insofar as they impeded themobility of customers
and flows of trade in themarket, but also the livelihoods of the traders (see below). Such cases were
often embellished by gendered accusations of moral transgression; for example, of witchcraft,
adultery and abortion. Accusations of witchcraft in Nakasero served to place limits on individual
accumulation, functioning as what Geschiere (1997) terms the ‘shadow side’ of kinship – or the
stick enforcing the redistributive ethic of omutima omuyambi (‘a heart for helping’ others)
(Scherz 2014). In making her case before the committee, Betty referenced a boundary that had
been agreed by the ‘landlords’ (leaseholders) of the two shops, which was subsequently upheld
by the committee.However, boundaries in other areas of themarketweremore difficult to establish:
Namagoye has been quarrelling with her neighbour Kiyabo for three months. The reason for this is
that Kiyabo puts his produce in her space, and when she complains he abuses her. She also throws
away his things when she finds them in her space. The last time they fought, Kiyabo had placed
passion fruits on her space and she stood on them. Kiyabo then took some of Namagoye’s
mangoes. When she tried to take them back, he twisted her arm and grabbed her neck.
Case 47, 12/07/2011
The above case is illustrative of the spatial dimensions of property in themarket throughwhich the
placement of goods in someone else’s spacewas likely to result in their destruction and/or removal.
Such cases were particularly prominent in the open areas of the market, where vendors pay a daily
‘pitch’ fee to themarket association rather than amonthly rent to a landlord (Monteith 2018, 21). In
the absence of material infrastructure, boundaries in this area of the market are largely the result of
jostling and negotiation; expanding and contracting through everyday practices of socialization
and exchange. In contrast to shops and stalls, ‘pitches’ could not be bought and sold as capital
goods; only rented from themarket association and expanded in linewith one’s social relationships
in the market. ‘Newcomers’ (bapya) entering this area of the market without prior connections
found it difficult to defend the boundaries of their pitch. In the above case, Namagoye and
Kiyabo were instructed to apologize to each other (‘both accepted to forgive the other and
pledged not to have misunderstandings again’) and write letters of apology to the committee.5
Success in Nakasero market, as in any marketplace, required access to commercial space. We
have shown in this section that the disciplinary committee upheld a principle of private property
insofar as it applied to the ownership of shops and stalls in the market, thus defending the inter-
ests of a rentier class and reproducing inequalities between leaseholders and renters. However, at
the same time, stalls and shops were often gifted in ways that were suggestive of a system of
personal patronage rather than impersonal market exchange. Furthermore, the complexity of
ownership arrangements in the open areas of the market betrayed the binaries of owner/renter
and landlord/tenant. Instead, claims over space were established via a process of day-to-day jos-
tling and negotiation which necessitated an investment in social relationships in the market. In
such areas, the disciplinary committee sought to resolve conflicts and remove blockages in
order to facilitate trade and defend livelihoods, demonstrating an understanding of the market
as a social as much as an economic space.
Debt
Claims to property often preceded claims to rent in the market, and both landlords and tenants
used the disciplinary committee to resolve disputes around rent and debt. For example, the fol-
lowing case was brought to the committee by the tenant of a market stall in April 2011:
Ms. Ttonda reports that she was paying rent to Ms. Kisozi for 200,000 USh [per month]. However,
Ttonda’s children became sick and she couldn’t work or pay rent for four months [800,000 USh / US
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$ 218]. When she returned, Kisozi did not let her continue in the place. Ttonda asked Kisozi to let her
work so she could pay off the debt, but she refused…Kisozi told her to get a new place and refused
to let her collect her items.
Case 41, 12/04/2011
Ms. Kisozi tells the committee that she wants Ms. Ttonda to pay some of the rent so that she can
return her belongings and then write a commitment letter outlining how she will pay the remainder
of the debt. Ms. Ttonda accepts to pay 200,000 now and the balance once her belongings have been
returned. Kisozi says she will return all Ttonda’s items apart from the fridge. She says she will reduce
the remaining debt from 600,000 to 400,000. The committee comments that it is ‘not fair’ to withhold
the fridge.
Case 41, 10/05/2011
Ms. Ttonda comes to the DC with the balance of 400,000. All items that were confiscated by Ms.
Kisozi (listed) have now been returned. Both parties sign.
Case 41, 13/03/2012
This case, which was a fairly standard case of rent default in Nakasero, complicates market-
oriented understandings of debt in several ways: (i) the debt accrued by Ms. Ttonda was paid
off over a relatively long period of time (11 months), (ii) the debt was reduced rather than
increased over this time period, and (iii) it was deemed ‘unfair’ for the creditor to withhold pro-
ductive goods (including the fridge) as collateral. Ultimately, one quarter of Ms Tamale’s debt
(USh 200,000) was forgiven on account of her ill health. This debt was negotiated and
amended in line with what she could reasonably afford to pay – a calculation was shaped by
her health and ability to feed her family, as well as her income in the market.6 Indeed, the com-
mittee began many such cases by asking the debtor what monthly payments they could reason-
ably afford to make before establishing a repayment schedule based on this amount, enshrined in
a ‘commitment letter’ signed by the debtor. This approach was generally supported by creditors
and debtors insofar as it enabled the former to claim a significant proportion of the debt while
protecting the latter from extortion. In short, the protocols of the disciplinary committee were
designed to recover as much as possible of the landlord’s rent without destroying the livelihood
of the tenant, upholding principles of affordability and ‘something for everyone’ in order to limit
instances of exit and ruination (Clark 2002, 56).7
In this sense, the rental agreement was not interpreted in the context of an abstracted market
economy (as ‘capital debt’ accruing interest), but in the context of an embedded market society,
in which people possess diverse constraints and obligations outside of the formal rules of market
exchange. While the committee upheld the principle of private property and rent in favour of the
landlord, this principle was not absolute, but rather interpreted in the context of the socioeco-
nomic circumstances of the tenant, including the welfare of their dependants. Economistic under-
standings of value were thus tempered by a concern for relational value – the positive value
attached to the ‘creation, reproduction and extension of relationships’ (Elyachar 2005, 143).
The committee treated other forms of debt in similar ways. For example, there was a general
understanding that suppliers took on a proportion of the risk when extending lines of credit to
vendors in the market:
Mr. Katuntu sold Mr. Samula 98kg of beef worth USh 343,000 on 24/12/2010 on credit. Mr. Samula
[subsequently] told him that the beef had not sold well and said that he would sell it over the Christ-
mas season. After three days, Katuntu came back to collect his money but was told by Samula that he
had failed to sell 20kg. Katuntu asked his friend Amoni to weigh the remaining beef for him, and
Amoni guessed that there was 30kg remaining. Katuntu is now requesting payment for 68kg of
beef. Samula testified that Katuntu had delivered more than he had expected and so some of the
extra beef went bad [spoiled]. After listening to both sides, the committee decided that the loss of
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98kg should be shared by both sides, so Mr. Samula owes Mr. Katuntu USh 171,500. The first
payment is to be paid on 07/03/2011, followed by the balance on 22/3/2011.
Case 39, 22/02/2011
The case record contained a number of similar examples relating to the sale of watermelons
(case 56), tomatoes (59) and mangoes (61), all of which spoiled after purchase. In each case,
the committee divided financial responsibility for the loss between the buyer and seller. In this
way, it served to collectivize debt rather than impose it on one particular party, reducing the
risk of ruination and exit among petty traders. Debt was thus not understood as individualized
and absolute, but rather relational and contingent and thus subject to negotiation and change.
Traders’ interactions were understood to generate obligations to others outside of those defined
by formal market economy, including an obligation to transact again in the future. These find-
ings draw parallels with Kinyanjui’s (2019, 119) discussion of ‘solidarity entrepreneurism’
through which market vendors in Nairobi collaborate via collective allegiances in order to
share spaces and transaction costs while deciding together ‘which risks to take and which
to avoid’.
However, not all debts were considered equal. One financial commitment that was more dif-
ficult to negotiate in the market was that relating to the health and education of one’s children and
a number of vendors asked the disciplinary committee to enforce school fee payments on their
(ex-)spouses in the market:
Ms. Nsozi separated from her husband Mulira in 1996, and since then he has not been supporting
their children. One of them is in Senior 3 and another in Senior 5.8 She says she is struggling
to look after them, which is why she has come to the committee. The committee decided that
Mulira should provide the committee with receipts of their school fees which they will keep
in their files.
Case 66, 20/03/2012
In three out of four such cases (‘domestic disputes’), absent fathers were reported to the commit-
tee by their (ex-)wives and reprimanded for not contributing sufficiently towards the health and
education of their children.9 In another example, a man accused of abandoning a woman in the
market after fathering her child was ordered to gift her two kilograms of sugar and facilitate her
transport to her home village. Such debts were understood to be more serious and less negotiable
than the forms of debt examined above for two reasons. Firstly, unpaid school and medical fees
directly impinged on the education and health of the children of market vendors and were thus
seen to carry a more immediate social cost than debts owed to landlords or suppliers; a finding
that is supported by the fact that moneylenders in the market charged lower interest rates for
school fee loans in spite of the fact that these loans entailed higher levels of financial risk (see
Monteith 2018). Secondly and relatedly, such debts suggested the subversion of a valued
social role in the market – that of the male provider and ‘feeder’ of people (Scherz 2014, 19).
Debts were thus interpreted and negotiated in the context of a market society in which
success was measured not only in terms of economic assets but also ‘how people treat others
and conduct themselves socially’, including a concern for the care and education of one’s depen-
dants (Kinyanjui 2019, 121).
Livelihood
We have seen that ideas of property and debt were upheld by the committee not as universal laws,
but moral principles which had to be weighed against other principles in circulation in the
market. One such principle was that of the right to a living, and some of the committee’s
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most severe punishments were reserved for cases in which this principle was thought to have
been violated:
Kyaluzi Benjamin reports that Ntabaala Jane tried to block the cleaners from passing while they were
doing their work. He saw people making noise when the cleaners were trying to remove the dirt. Nta-
baala refused to leave the area and wanted to beat them… She has been suspended from the market
for one month for blocking the work of the people who were cleaning the market and for using a
tongue which disrespected the leaders.
Case 9, 15/01/2010
The above case was reported by a leader in the chicken department of Nakasero market. The
accusation was that Ntabaala had obstructed ‘the work of the people who were cleaning the
market’, thus disrupting the livelihoods of said persons, disregarding the instructions of
market leaders and endangering the cleanliness of the market. Vendors are expected to
employ cleaners to remove dirt and spoiled produce from around their stalls for a daily sum
of between USh 1000–2000 (US $0.26–0.52). Those engaged in this task are usually young
men who arrive in Kampala without the contacts or capital required to enter more profitable
sectors of the market – people that continue to be arrested and displaced from Nakasero under
the colonial Vagrancy Act. When we asked why vendors employ these young men to clean
their stalls rather than doing it themselves, they often invoked the moral principle of ‘something
for everyone’ (Clark 2002, 56), emphasizing that ‘these people, they are trying to survive’. At the
same time, the young men provided a service that enabled wealthier members of the market to
avoid forms of work that were understood to be dirty and degrading.
The case record contains two other examples of livelihood obstruction, or people being
‘chased’ from the market. In one case, Farida, a chicken vendor, returned from maternity
leave to discover that one of her employees had set up her own business in the market. She
phoned her former employee to tell her to ‘leave the market, because she has taken [my] custo-
mers’ and encouraged other people to do the same (case 25, 31/08/2010). Both women were
instructed to write letters of apology to the committee. Farida’s letter reads: ‘I am writing for for-
giveness for the mistakes I made that diverted me from the reason I am in the market. I hated on
the following ladies… For the above reasons, I thank the committee for settling the matter and
bringing us back to friendship’ (31/08/2010). In the second case, a female vendor paid USh
200,000 (US$ 55) to a group of people in the watermelon department ‘to chase away a lady
called Sylvia’. Again, she was instructed to write a letter of apology.
James Ferguson argues that the work of ‘surviving’ in Southern Africa ‘is in large measure
about accessing or making claims on the resources of others’ (2015, 94). Similarly, in Buganda,
we have seen that institutions such as the Nakasero market disciplinary committee play an impor-
tant role in mediating and legitimizing such claims by punishing people who were seen to have
neglected their obligation to feed others by obstructing or denying their work in the market. Jane
(case 9, above) was handed a one-month suspension from the market; a serious punishment that
was itself a form of livelihood obstruction. She brought this point to the attention of the commit-
tee in a carefully constructed letter of apology:
I apologise and I ask for forgiveness so that I can work again. I ask the leaders of the market for for-
giveness for everything that I did, I have learnt, and I swear, my bosses (bakama bange) not to do it
again… I request that you allow me to work again because I have a sick mother who can’t manage
herself. I also look after my brother’s children who are orphans, in addition to my own, and the land-
lord is chasing us out of the house. So, if I am not working, the children will be without food for day
and night, and my mother will die because she will not get treatment. My bosses, help me to return to
my job and look for money (noonya ekikumi; literally ‘look for one hundred’ shillings).
Letter of apology, 19/01/2010
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In her work in markets in Kilimanjaro, Tuulikki Pietilä (2007) observes that many women
claimed to be trading in order to ‘feed their children’; a phrase which was understood to encom-
pass the act of provisioning for all of one’s dependants. In a similar vein, Jane’s letter provides a
moving account of the ways in which the various inequities of the market economy in Kampala
restricted her ability to fulfil a moral duty to provide for her dependant family members. By
connecting her work in the market to the welfare of her mother and (adopted) children, she
invoked a relational understanding of value which brought into question the moral legitimacy
of the committee’s verdict in a way that is reminiscent of the 2008 protests (‘don’t you want
us to eat?’). Her punishment was subsequently reduced to a two-week suspension.
Conclusions
The classical literature on moral economy demonstrates the ways in which people in eighteenth
and nineteenth century England responded to the advance of market economy by drawing upon
customs and traditions from the past (Thompson 1971). This process of struggle or ‘double
movement’ (Polanyi 1957 [1944]) refused the separation of economy and society, subordinat-
ing the former to a broad range of social, moral and political principles beyond the realm of
formal market exchange. In a not dissimilar way, we have shown that market vendors in
twenty-first century Uganda responded to attempts to privatize the ownership of marketplaces
by invoking principles derived from the past, including the moral obligation to feed others,
which has a long history in the Buganda region (Hanson 2003; Scherz 2014). However,
rather than invoked to ensure sustenance through the gifts of local chiefs, this principle was
deployed to defend livelihoods through appeals to influential politicians and market leaders.
In other words, the obligation to feed others was mobilized in order to gain access to the
means of a livelihood (a space in the market), rather than its ends (the direct provision of
food or capital).10 There are parallels here with the moral economies of post-war welfare
states, which placed great moral emphasis on the right to work. However, vendors in Nakasero
defended their livelihoods not through appeals to individual rights but collective obligations;
for example, by listing their dependants. Economistic understandings of value were thus tem-
pered by a concern for relational value, or the positive value attached to the ‘creation, repro-
duction and extension of relationships’ (Elyachar 2005, 143).
One of the key contributions of the classical literature on moral economy is the obser-
vation that all economic markets must be embedded in social institutions and communities
in order to survive; even early capitalists recognized that ‘social peace was more important
than absolute property rights or, rather, profit rights’ (Thompson 1993, 293). Rather than a
uniform representative of the state, crowd or capitalist class in Kampala, the Nakasero
market disciplinary committee was an intermediary institution that represented the interests
of a rentier class of predominantly male market vendors who were the primary beneficiaries
of the policy to lease out market stalls in the early postcolonial period. The work of the com-
mittee largely involved reconciliating different interests in the market in order to preserve the
flow of trade without challenging broader structural inequalities; for example, by recovering
as much as possible of the landlord’s rent without destroying the livelihood of the tenant; by
enforcing the credit of the supplier without bankrupting the petty trader. The work of the
committee thus served to legitimise rather than confront stark material inequalities in the
market. However, it placed these inequalities in the context of a market society in which
wealth is understood to entail obligations to others. It is this moral principle – the obligation
to feed others – that vendors continue to return to amid broader processes of privatization and
displacement in Kampala.
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Notes
1. Buganda is the name of the region, Baganda the people and Kiganda the culture (often shortened to
‘Ganda’).
2. Self-reported incomes from authors’ survey conducted in 2014.
3. The disciplinary records contain a mix of Luganda and English – most of the notes were written in
Luganda, while official correspondence was often in English.
4. All names have been changed in order to preserve anonymity.
5. The predominance of the letter of apology within the case record illustrates both the importance of
reputation in the market and the attempt by the (new) market leadership to reproduce its legitimacy.
6. In another example, a woman who owed money to a savings round had her debt reduced and repay-
ment schedule extended after she contracted an eye problem (case 54).
7. A similar logic is visible in the formal economy, where creditors often accept reduced debts – or assets
sold at auction – rather than risk forcing debtors into bankruptcy.
8. The Ugandan education system is divided between seven years of primary education (P1–P7) and six
years of secondary education (S1–S6).
9. At the same time, female plaintiffs were often reprimanded by the committee for disrespecting their
(absent) husbands and instructed to ‘be humble and start to respect [them]’ (case 30). It is for this
reason that they are also listed accused persons in Table 1.





Austen, Ralph A. 1993. “The Moral Economy of Witchcraft: An Essay in Comparative History.” In
Modernity and its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa, edited by John Comaroff
and Jean Comaroff, 89–110. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Banaji, Jairus. 2015. Exploring the Economy of Late Antiquity: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Baral, Anna. 2018. “Bad Guys, Good Life: An Ethnography of Morality and Change in Kisekka Market
(Kampala, Uganda).” In Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology 58. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis
Upsaliensis.
Bayart, Jean-Francois. 1993. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. London and New York:
Longman.
Beresford, Alexander, and Hannah Cross. 2015. “The Politics of Globalized Labour in Africa.” Critical
African Studies 7 (1): 1–6.
Bohannan, Paul, and George Dalton. 1962. Markets in Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clark, Gracia. 1994. Onions Are My Husband: Survival and Accumulation by West African Market Women.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Critical African Studies 15
Clark, Gracia. 2002. “Market Association Leaders’ Strategic Use of Language and Narrative in Market
Disputes and Negotiations in Kumasi, Ghana.” Africa Today 49 (1): 43–58.
Elyachar, Julia. 2005. Markets of Disposession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ferguson, James. 2015. Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution. Durham and
London: Duke University Press.
Geschiere, Peter. 1997. The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa.
Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press.
Goodfellow, Tom, and Kristof Titeca. 2012. “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of
Survival’ in Kampala’s Informal Economy.” Cities 29 (4): 264–270.
Gore, Christopher., and Nansozi K. Muwanga. 2013. “Decentralization is Dead, Long Live
Decentralization! Capital City Reform and Political Rights in Kampala, Uganda.” International
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38 (6): 2201–2216.
Götz, Norbert. 2015. “‘Moral Economy’: Its Conceptual History and Analytical Prospects.” Journal of
Global Ethics 11 (2): 147–162.
Guyer, Jane I., ed. 1987. Feeding African Cities: Studies in Regional Social History. London and New York:
Routledge.
Guyer, Jane I. 1993. “Wealth in People and Self-Realization in Equatorial Africa.” Man 28 (2): 243–265.
Hansen, Karen Tranberg, Walter E. Little, and B. Lynne Milgram, eds. 2013. Street Economies in the Urban
Global South. Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press.
Hanson, Holly E. 2003. Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda. Portsmouth, NH:
Heinemann.
Jones, William O. 1972.Marketing Staple Food Crops in Tropical Africa. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Jones, Ben. 2009. Beyond the State in Rural Uganda. Edited by International African Institute. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Kapchan, Deborah. 1996. Gender on the Market: Moroccan Women and the Revoicing of Tradition.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Kasirye, Joseph S. 1954. “Abateregga ba Mulondo ya Buganda (Royal Princes of Buganda), Rubaga,
1954.” In Sources Material in Uganda History, Vol. II, collected and translated by the Department
of History, 377–464. Kampala: Makerere University.
Kinyanjui, Mary Njeri. 2019. African Markets and the Utu-Buntu Business Model: A Perspective in
Economic Informality in Nairobi. Cape Town: African Minds.
Lindell, Ilda. 2010. Africa’s Informal Workers: Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing
in Urban Africa. London: Zed.
Lindell, Ilda, Christine Ampaire, and Andrew Byerley. 2019. “Governing Urban Informality: Re-Working
Spaces and Subjects in Kampala, Uganda.” International Development Planning Review 41 (1): 63–84.
Lindell, Ilda, and Jenny Appelblad. 2009. “Disabling Governance: Privatisation of City Markets
and Implications for Vendors’ Associations in Kampala, Uganda.” Habitat International 33 (4):
397–404.
Lonsdale, John. 1992. “The Moral Economy of Mau-Mau: Wealth, Poverty and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu
Political Thought.” In Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa, edited by B. Berman and J.
Lonsdale 315–486. London: James Currey.
Lund, Christian. 2006. “Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa.” Development
and Change 37 (4): 685–705.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1990. “Uganda: Contradictions of the IMF Programme and Perspective.”
Development and Change 21 (1990): 427–467.
Mattingly, Cheryl. 2014. Moral Laboratories: Family Peril and the Struggle for a Good Life. Oakland:
University of California Press.
Mbembe, Achille. 2001. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Meagher, Kate. 2007. “Manufacturing Disorder: Liberalization, Informal Enterprise and Economic
‘Ungovernance’ in African Small Firm Clusters.” Development and Change 38 (3): 473–503.
Meagher, Kate, Laura Mann, andMaxim Bolt. 2016. “Introduction: Global Economic Inclusion and African
Workers.” Journal of Development Studies 52 (4): 471–482.
Médard, Henri. 2006. “Marchés, Échanges et Relations Sociales Au Buganda à La Fin Du Xixe Siècle.”
Afrique & Histoire 5: 147–173.
Monteith, William. 2017. “Showing ‘Heart’ Through Ethnography.” City 21 (2): 178–189.
Monteith, William. 2018. “Showing ‘Heart’ While Making Money: Negotiating Proximity in a Ugandan
Marketplace.” Africa 88 (S1): S12–S30.
16 W. Monteith and L. Camfield
Monteith, William. 2019. “Markets and Monarchs: Indigenous Urbanism in Postcolonial Kampala.” Settler
Colonial Studies 9: 247–265.
Musisi, Nakanyike. 1995. “Buganda Women’s Night Market Activities.” In African Market Women and
Economic Power, edited by F. K. Ekechi and B. House-Midamba, 121–139. Westport Conn:
Greenwood Press.
Nkwankwo, Nkechi. 2019. “Spatial Politics and Gendered Strategies: Women Traders and Institutions in
Oke Arin Market, Lagos.” Africa 89 (1): 61–78.
Omobowale, Mofeyisara Oluwatoyin. 2019. “Class, Gender, Sexuality, and Leadership in Bodija Market,
Ibadan, Nigeria.” Journal of Anthropological Research 75 (2): 235–251.
Orlove, Benjamin S. 1997. “Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot.” Cultural
Anthropology 12 (2): 234–268.
Ouma, Stefan. 2015. Assembling Export Markets: The Making and Unmaking of Global Food Connections
in West Africa. London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Palomera, Jaime, and Theodora Vetta. 2016. “Moral Economy: Rethinking a Radical Concept.”
Anthropological Theory 16 (4): 413–432.
Pietilä, Tuulikki. 2007. Gossip, Markets, and Gender: How Dialogue Constructs Moral Value in Post-
Socialist Kilimanjaro. Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Prunier, Gerard. 1983. “Le Magendo: Essai Sur Quelques Aspects Marginaux Des Échanges Commerciaux
En Afrique Orientale.” Politique Africaine 9: 53–62.
Scherz, China. 2014. Having People, Having Heart: Charity, Sustainable Development and Problems of
Dependence in Central Uganda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Scott, James. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Simone, Abdoumaliq, and Edgar Pieterse. 2017. New Urban Worlds: Inhabiting Dissonant Times. London:
Polity.
Tangri, Roger, and Andrew M. Mwenda. 2001. “Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda’s Privatisation in the
1990s.” African Affairs 100 (398): 117–113.
Thompson, Edward P. 1971. “The Moral Economy of English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” Past and
Present 50 (1): 76–136.
Thompson, Edward P. 1993. Customs in Common. London: Penguin Classics.
Tripp, Aili Mari. 1997. Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal
Economy in Tanzania. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wiegratz, Jörg. 2016. Neoliberal Moral Economy: Capitalism, Socio-Cultural Change and Fraud in
Uganda. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
Wiegratz, Jörg, Giuliano Martiniello, and Elisa Greco. 2018. Uganda: The Dynamics of Neoliberal
Transformation. London: Zed Books.
Young, Graeme. 2021. “Development, Division and Discontent in Informal Markets: Insights from
Kampala.” Review of African Political Economy Online First: 1–21.
Critical African Studies 17
